We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a prooftheoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions.
Introduction
Input/output-logic. Input/output logic (henceforth I/O logic) was introduced by Makinson and van der Torre [29, 30] as a formal tool for modeling non-monotonic reasoning with conditionals. It belongs to a broader family of formal systems developed with this purpose in mind, such as, for instance, Gabbay [17] , Crocco et al. [16] , Kraus et al. [24] , Lehmann et al. [25] , and Boutilier [14] . I/O logics also provided the groundworks for Bochman's production inference relations that are useful to model causal and abductive inferences [12] . As argued in [32] , the main motivation for I/O logic concerns problems of deontic logic.
1 I/O logics have been used e.g. to model various types of permissions [31, 43] , to capture the dynamics of normative systems and regulations [13] , and to formalize reasoning with contrary-toduty obligations [32] . 2 Technically speaking, I/O logics (without constraints, cf. infra) are operations that map every pair G, A to an "output", where (i) G is a set of 1 See also [20] for a survey of ten such problems, presented using the I/O terminology. 2 We speak of I/O logic (singular) to denote the overall framework that is common to a number of systems, which we call I/O logics. Alternatively, we will sometimes call the latter I/O operations or I/O functions.
"input/output pairs" (A, B) where A and B are propositional formulas; (ii) A stands for "input", i.e. a set of propositional formulas; and (iii) the output is also a set of propositional formulas.
In a deontic setting, A usually represents factual information, G is a set of conditional obligations (A, B) interpreted e.g. as "A commits you to B" or "Under condition B you are obliged to bring about A", 3 and the output consists of what is obligatory, given the facts at hand. However, as stressed in [29, 30] , one may also apply I/O logic in other contexts. For instance, in a default logic setting the output can be interpreted as a set of hypotheses, derived from the data A and a set G of (normal) defaults.
In either of these interpretations of A and G, it is often useful to consider a set C of constraints on the output-this notion was introduced in [30] . C restricts the output in one of two senses, each corresponding to a different style of reasoning. We can require the output as a whole to be consistent with C, or we can impose the weaker requirement that, for each A in the output, {A} ∪ C has to be consistent. Depending on the application context C may represent physical constraints, human rights, etc.
In view of these two styles of reasoning, Makinson and van der Torre define corresponding variants of their I/O logics. Given a set of I/O pairs G, the basic idea is to reason on the basis of maximal subsets of G that produce an output that is consistent with the constraints in C. See Section 2.3 for the exact definitions and more explanation. We will henceforth speak of constrained I/O logics to denote these operations. This paper. Our aim is to represent I/O logics as deductive systems within a rich modal language. 4 Meta-level expressions such as A ∈ A or (A, B) ∈ G will be expressible in the object-level, resulting in expressions like inA and inA ⇒ outB respectively, where in and out are unary modal operators and ⇒ is a binary connective. We will see that this language is not only sufficient to characterize many well-known I/O logics (Sections 2, 3), but it allows us to go beyond the expressive means of I/O logics so as to express useful notions in deontic logic such as violations, sanctions, and permissions (Section 4). 3 Many subtle distinctions arise when giving meaning to deontic modalities in the context of formal normative systems (e.g., we can read them descriptively or prescriptively, we can read them as ought-to-be or as ought-to-do, etc.): since in this paper these subtleties are not crucial we will not discuss them any further. 4 There are two representations for I/O logics: a semantic and a syntactic or axiomatic one. In this paper we will focus on I/O logics that have an adequate axiomatic representation. It should be noted that although for many I/O logics presented in the literature there is a known sound and complete axiomatization, there are exceptions such as [43] .
In order to characterize constraints, we use a framework for dynamic deductive systems known from non-monotonic logic, namely the framework of adaptive logics (henceforth ALs). 5 First, in Section 2.4, we further extend the modal language-e.g. adding a modal operator con to express constraints. Second, the resulting monotonic modal logic is strengthened by means of a defeasible deductive mechanism, which mimics the selection of maximal sets of I/O pairs at the object-level-see Section 3.1.
Motivation. There are various independent motivations for the formal work presented in this paper. First and foremost, characterizing I/O logics by means of ALs enables us to use dynamic deductive systems for modeling reasoning with conditionals (see Section 3.1). To the best of our knowledge, deductive systems that are adequate with respect to the consequence relations of (constrained) I/O logic have not yet been presented in the literature.
Second, an important advantage of adaptive proofs is that they allow for the representation of various forms of defeasible reasoning. As we argue in Section 3.1, there are two facets of defeasibility both of which are explicated via the dynamics of adaptive proofs. One concerns the non-monotonicity of the consequence relation and is expressed via the notion of final derivability (see Definition 12) . Another concerns the more internalised dynamics that occurs in the process of analyzing the given information (without any new input) which is expressed by the notion of derivability-at-a-stage (see Definition 11) .
Our third point is related. A stage of an adaptive proof represents a (possibly partial and defeasible) analysis of the given information and can as such be reused and extended in contexts in which we have more input, more rules, or more constraints. This modularity ensures that the reasoning process (explicated by an adaptive proof) need not start from scratch again when the context changes and more analysis is needed. Instead, the dynamic retraction mechanism of adaptive proofs takes care of this.
Fourth, by means of a rich modal language we are able to express inputs, outputs, contraints, and I/O pairs in the object language. As a result, our formalism is more expressive than the original framework of I/O logics (see Section 4) so that it is possible to also express violations, sanctions, and permissions.
Fifth, due to its modularity, the modal framework allows for variation in a controlled and systematic way (see Section 5.1). For instance, different types of conflict-handling-so-called "strategies" in the AL terminologyresult in alternative, yet equally well-behaved systems, some of which have not yet been defined in the context of I/O logic. As in I/O logic one can easily alter the set of rules that govern the conditionals, adapting it to a given application.
Overview. In Section 2 we present the framework of I/O logic in its unconstrained and constrained form, and we introduce a modal characterization of the unconstrained I/O operations. Next, we extend our modal characterization within the adaptive logics framework so as to obtain non-monotonic modal adaptive systems corresponding to the constrained I/O operations (Section 3). Representation results are provided for our modal characterizations in both the unconstrained setting (Theorem 2) and the constrained setting (Theorem 3).
While the characterization of I/O logics is already possible in a fragment of our modal language, we show in Section 4 that using the full language results in a significant increase of expressive power.
In Section 5 we present some new natural variations on existing I/O logics (Section 5.1), we offer some comparisons to existing systems (Section 5.2), and we make suggestions as to how our framework can be be further extended with priorities, by allowing for quantitative considerations and by using a predicative language (Section 5.3). We conclude the paper in Section 6. from Γ, and L A to denote that A is L-derivable from the empty premise set.
Characterizing the I/O logics. In this section, we define the unconstrained I/O logics from [29] . These are defined as functions that map each pair G, A with a set of facts A ⊆ W and a set of I/O pairs G ⊆ W × W to an output set out R (G, A) ⊆ W, where R is a set of rules for I/O pairs. We sometimes refer to G as the set of generators. As shown in [29] , each of these functions can be characterized in two equivalent ways-one is called "semantic", the other "syntactic". In the remainder of this section we define the I/O functions along the lines of the syntactic characterization. 
We will sometimes writeR denoting the set of rules in R together with all the rules that are derivable from R. For instance, where R contains (WO), (EQ) ∈R.
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In this paper we will consider sets of rules R containing at least (SI), (AND) and (EQ) (i.e., (SI), (AND), (EQ) ∈R). We shall refer to such sets as normal sets of rules. All the sets of rules originally defined in [29] are normal (they consist of at least (SI), (AND) and (WO) which makes (EQ) derivable). The production inference relations in [12] validate additionally 6 Often the syntactic versions of I/O logics are written as deriv R while out R is reserved for the semantic versions. In this paper we will stick to out R for the syntactic versions due to its suggestive name: the function produces output. 7 More precisely,R is the maximal superset of R such that for all sets of I/O-pairs G, applying R to G results in the same set of I/O-pairs as applyingR to G. By G R we denote the closure of G under R. 9 The general form of the syntactic construction is given by Definition 1. Table 1 shows, among others, how the I/O operations out 1 to out 4 and out + 1 to out + 4 from [29] are obtained by combinations of the rules defined above.
11 Note that all of them make use of (SI), (AND) and (WO). To cover the border case where G = ∅, one needs to add the (zero premise) rule (Z) in order to ensure that all tautologies are in the output (see [30, p. 157] ). The sets of rules out 1 , out 2 and out 3 have been defined in [35, 36] . The main difference with respect to the rules from [29] is that these rules give up on (WO) and instead only make use of the weaker (EQ). 8 More precisely, the reconstructions we offer in subsequent sections will be adequate for normal sets of rules given that the set of facts A is CL-consistent or that (F) ∈R. Our reconstructions trivialize inconsistent sets of facts while the corresponding original I/O logics do not trivialize them, except when rules such as (F) are derivable. 9 As usual, the closure of a set X under a set of rules R is the smallest superset of X that is closed under applications of rules in R. 10 Here is why: (⇒) is trivial. [30] .
When giving examples in this paper, we will only use the operation of simple-minded output out 1 which allows us to focus on the formal novelties that are introduced in the current paper. For an elaborate discussion of the other I/O functions, the reader is referred to [29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 41, 42] .
Let us note some general properties of the I/O functions. The first two facts show that Definition 1 warrants syntax-independency:
The output of normal sets of rules is closed under conjunction and under classical equivalence:
Suppose the antecedent holds. Thus, there is a C ∈ Cn CL (A) for which (C, A) ∈ G R . By (EQ), (C, B) ∈ G R and thus B ∈ out R (G, A).
Example 1 illustrates the interplay between input, generators and output for the specific case of out 1 .
By (SI) we can derive (a ∧ b, c) and (a ∧ b, d) from (a, c) and (b, d) respectively. By (AND), we obtain (a∧b, c∧d). Since a∧b ∈ Cn CL (A), (c∧d) ∈ out 1 (G, A). Similarly, we get e ∈ out 1 (G, A) since a ∧ b ∈ Cn CL (A) and (a ∧ b, e) ∈ G.
An Alternative Characterization
In this section, we provide a modal logic characterization of the I/O operations from the preceding section.
12 As we will argue in Section 3, the 12 In [29] Makinson and van der Torre also present modal characterizations of some (unconstrained) I/O functions. However, their translation does not cover the four cases where (OR) is invalid. Moreover, it is hard to see how this translation can be adjusted to the context of constrained I/O logics. For this reason, we present a different modal characterization. We return to this point in Section 5.1. Bochman in [12] presents another semantic characterization of his 'production inference relations' (i.e., I/O logics that satisfy (SI), (WO), (AND), (Z) and (F)) based on classical bimodels (i.e., pairs of CL-consistent and CL-deductively closed sets).
resulting systems allow us to model reasoning about inputs, conditionals and output in a natural and very expressive language.
Where, as before, W is the set of well-formed formulas of CL, the set W of well-formed formulas is given by the following grammar:
Given a pair G, A , the idea is to represent 'factual' inputs A ∈ A by inA, I/O pairs (A, B) in G by in A ⇒ out B, and outputs by outB. Let us henceforth abbreviate in A ⇒ out B by A → B.
We interpret the input operator in as a KD-modality:
Note that in view of I/O logics that do not validate (WO) it would be too strong to also model out as a K-modality. For such logics we can simply let out be a property-less dummy-operator. For the characterization of other I/O logics we can model out as a K-modality. 13 The binary connective ⇒ is fully characterized by modus ponens:
Note that modus ponens for ⇒ allows to derive outB from inA and A → B. We write (MP ⊃ ) for modus ponens relative to ⊃. Where R is given, let R → denote the associated set of rules for conditionals in which each rule in R (where
is translated according to the translation schemes in Table 2. 14 For instance, (CT) is translated to 13 It should be noted that our representation theorems do not depend on the fact that out is interpreted as a K-modality. In other words, this interpretation is admissible as soon as the corresponding I/O logic validates (WO).
14 We opted for a conditional ⇒ that is weaker than material implication ⊃ since we want to also characterise rather weak I/O logics. For instance, were we to choose ⊃ as our ⇒, OR → would be a derived rule. 
and (WO) is translated to We write MIO R whenever we refer to any of the two variants. Theorem 2. Where A is CL-consistent or (F) ∈R:
Note that our representation theorem does not cover the border case where A is inconsistent. In this case, it follows from the KD-properties of in that Γ G,A MIO R ⊥ and hence also Γ G,A MIO R outA for all A ∈ W. On the other hand, where A is inconsistent, out R (G, A) need not be trivial in case (F) is not derivable from R. In that case:
In the remainder, let MIO 1 denote the modal logic that corresponds to the operation of simple-minded output out 1 defined in the previous section. We briefly illustrate MIO 1 by means of our previous example. Recall, A = {a, b} and G = {(a, c),
Applying Definition 2, we obtain the premise set 
Also, from in(a∧b) and the premise (a∧b) → e, we can derive oute by means of (MP ⇒ ).
Constrained I/O Logics
In [30] , Makinson and van der Torre extend their I/O framework in order to deal with excess output. Such an excess can arise in various ways. The output may be inconsistent per se, or the output may be inconsistent with the input. Suppose, for instance, that G = {( , ¬a), (a, b)} and A = {a}. Then out 1 (G, A) = Cn({¬a, b}) is consistent, but inconsistent with the input a. For the operations that use the rule (ID), both types of excess coincide.
More generally, one may also think of excessive output as output which conflicts with certain physical, practical or normative principles. To cover all such cases, a constraint set C ⊆ W is introduced. The cases C = ∅ and C = A allow us to express consistency of output, and its consistency with input A respectively.
The strategy used by Makinson and van der Torre for eliminating excess output is "to cut back the set of generators to just below the threshold of yielding excess" [30, p. 160] . Using well-known techniques from nonmonotonic logic, they prune the set of generators to obtain its maximal non-excessive subsets. 
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Similar to the notions of skeptical resp. credulous consequence from nonmonotonic logic, Definition 5 gives rise to operations of full meet resp. full join constrained output. (H, A) . 17 For readers unfamiliar with the notions of skeptical and credulous consequence, we refer to [22, 28] for more details. As mentioned in the introduction, there are two ways in which one may pose constraints on the output. According to the first, the output set as a whole is required to be consistent with C; according to the second, each formula A in the output is required to be consistent with C. Definition 6 gives us an operation that respects the first requirement, whereas Definition 7 results in an operation that respects the second.
By Definition 7, c ∈ out 
Extending the Alternative Characterization with Constraints
Before we can provide proof theories for the constrained I/O operations, we need to extend our modal characterization from Section 2.2. We define a new language W c which enriches W in two ways. First we add a modal operator con for modeling constraints. Second, we add a unary operator •. In the characterization of I/O logic we will use it for prefixing I/O pairs in the set G (the role of the •-operator is addressed below).
The modal operator con is characterized as a KD-modality:
Moreover, we add an axiom schema expressing that outputs should respect constraints:
conA ⊃ ¬out¬A (ROC) . CMIO R + is defined analogously, just that out is a K-modality.
We write CMIO R whenever we refer to any of the two variants. As mentioned above, Makinson and van der Torre deal with constraints by pruning the generating set G. Whereas in the constrained I/O systems I/O pairs in G are selected, in our system conditionals are activated by removing the bullet. First, I/O pairs in G are prefixed with the •-operator, which functions as a dummy operator. Next, a non-activated conditional
is activated by inferring from it the conditional A → B. Once activated, we can detach the output of triggered conditionals by means of (MP ⇒ ).
Definition 2 is adjusted accordingly:
For instance, where as before,
The systems characterized in Definition 8 are not yet equipped with a rule for activating conditionals. We cannot simply add the rule "If •(A → B), then A → B". Instead, we need a logic that can distinguish between cases in which activating a conditional is sensible and cases in which it is not. For instance, given the set {ina, inb,
, con¬d}, we want to be able to derive a → c from •(a → c) so that outc is derivable by means of (MP ⇒ ). However, given the constraint ¬d we also want to block
, otherwise we could again apply (MP ⇒ ) in order to derive outd.
What we are looking for, then, is a defeasible mechanism for strengthening the logics from Definition 8. To simplify slightly, we are looking for a mechanism that enables us to infer activated conditionals A → B from non-activated conditionals •(A → B), in such a way that B is in the output of G given A whenever A ∈ A and (A, B) ∈ G unless e.g. there is a constraint preventing the derivation of B. 18 In what follows, we define such a mechanism which is rich enough to characterize, for instance, all the I/O functions defined in Section 2.3.
Adaptive Logic Characterizations of I/O Logics

Dynamic Proofs for I/O Logics
Adaptive logics. The proof theory to be provided for the constrained I/O operations from Section 2.3 is that of the adaptive logics framework (see e.g. [6, 45] for a general introduction). An AL is usually characterized as a triple:
(a) ALs are built 'on top' of a lower limit logic (LLL). The AL allows for the application of all inferences valid in the LLL. The LLL has to be monotonic, transitive, reflexive and compact.
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(b) ALs strengthen their LLL by considering a set of formulas as false 'as much as possible'. This set of formulas is called the set of abnormalities and is denoted by Ω. The members of the set of abnormalities are required to be of a specific logical form, which depends on the application. For instance, in the setting of inconsistency-tolerant (paraconsistent) logic, the set may contain all formulas of the logical form A ∧ ¬A (see e.g. [3] ).
(c) The phrase 'as much as possible' in (b) is disambiguated by an adaptive strategy. The strategy specifies how to proceed in cases where e.g. we know that at least one of a number of abnormalities is true, but we do not know which. In such cases, reasoners may proceed in various ways: some more, some less cautious. We introduce various such strategies below.
We will present and illustrate the dynamic proof theory of ALs by means of the ALs MIO 
In what follows, we use A as an abbreviation for •A∧¬A. Abnormalities are generated, for instance, when a conditional is 'triggered' by the input while its consequent violates a constraint. Let, for example G = {(a, ¬b)}, A = {a}, and
By (ROC), we know that ¬out¬b is derivable from conb. By (MP ⇒ ) and
The 'motor' that drives the activation of conditionals is the (defeasible) assumption that abnormalities are false. Assume for instance that
If we can safely assume the second disjunct to be false, then the first must be true. This is-on an intuitive level-how the adaptive proof theory will allow us to activate conditionals. Let us now make this idea formally precise.
Adaptive proofs. A line in an annotated adaptive proof consists of four elements: a line number l, a formula A, a justification (consisting of a list of line numbers and a derivation rule), and a condition Δ. The condition of a line is a (possibly empty) finite set of abnormalities. Intuitively, we interpret a line l at which a formula A is derived on the condition Δ as "At line l of the proof, A is derived on the assumption that all members of Δ are false".
ALs have three generic rules of inference. The first is a premise introduction rule PREM, which allows formulas A from some set of premises Γ to be introduced on the empty condition at any stage in the proof.
. . . . . .
A ∅ The second rule is the unconditional rule RU, which allows for the use of all CMIO 1 -inferences:
The third generic rule of inference is the conditional rule RC. Where Θ is a finite set of abnormalities, let Dab(Θ) denote the classical disjunction of the members of Θ. 20 The rule RC is defined as follows: 1
Note that the second disjunct of the formula derived at line 3 is a member of Ω • . By RC, we can move this abnormality to the condition column:
At stage 5 of the proof, we have derived the formula a → b on the assumption that the abnormality (a → b) is false. The conditional at line 1 has been activated at line 5. By (MP ⇒ ), we know that ina∧(a → b) CMIO 1 outb. Hence we can detach the output outb by means of RU:
Note that, as required by the definition of RU, the condition of line 5 is carried over to line 4. The example shows how activated conditionals, when triggered by a matching input, can be used to detach the output.
The inference of outb from •(a → b) and ina is conditional. It depends on our assumption that (a → b) is false. As we will now illustrate, assumptions made in adaptive proofs are sometimes treated as inadmissible. In such cases, all inferences that depend on the assumptions in question are retracted from the proof.
Retracting inferences. Consider the following adaptive proof from Γ
As there is a constraint prohibiting that b is in the output, it seems that we have jumped to an incorrect conclusion at line 4.
21 In order to deal with such cases, ALs are equipped with a mechanism that determines the retraction or 'marking' of lines of which the condition can no longer be upheld.
Note that, by (ROC), con¬b CMIO 1 ¬outb. By (MP ⇒ ) and CL, con¬b
, which falsifies our assumption made at line 4:
At line 4 we mistakenly assumed that (a → b) is false. Once our assumption is shown to be inadmissible (at line 5), line 4 is marked (using the symbol 5 ), which means that this inference is now withdrawn from the proof.
The retraction mechanism is governed by a marking definition, which depends on the adaptive strategy. In the remainder of this section, we present two such strategies and their respective marking definitions. They correspond to various 'styles' of reasoning -skeptical versus credulous-, as we will now illustrate.
Consider a proof from
As out is a normal modal operator, we can aggregate the formulas derived at lines 6 and 7:
Clearly, something went wrong here. As there is a constraint prohibiting that the conjunction of c and d is in the output, we were too hasty in deriving out(c ∧ d). And indeed, although no abnormality is by itself derivable from the premises, the disjunction of abnormalities (a → c)
At stage 9 of the proof, we know that one of the abnormalities (a → c) or (b → d) holds, but we lack the information to determine which one. Clearly, line 8 should be retracted, as at that line we assumed both abnormalities to be false. But what about lines 6 and 7? If only the abnormality (a → c) turns out to be derivable, then our assumption at line 7 that (b → d) is false can safely be upheld. If only (b → d) turns out to be derivable, then the same holds for our assumption at line 6 that (a → c) is false.
In view of this information a skeptical reasoner may consider both assumptions too strong. As a result, she would retract lines 6 and 7 from the proof. A more credulous reasoner, on the other hand, may continue to reason on one assumption or the other, as none of them has been falsified beyond doubt. The credulous reasoner, then, would leave lines 6 and 7 unmarked.
The minimal abnormality strategy explicates the more skeptical reasoning, while the normal selections strategy explicates the more credulous reasoning. MIO 
In order to understand the marking for minimal abnormality, recall first: if A is derived on the condition Δ this encodes the assumption that none of the abnormalities in Δ is true. The minimal choice sets Θ in Φ s (Γ) represent minimally abnormal interpretations of all the disjunctions of abnormalities that have been derived on the empty condition so far. A formula A is considered successfully derived at stage s in case for each Θ ∈ Φ s (Γ) it is derived on an assumption (expressed by a condition Δ Θ ) that is not violated in Θ, i.e., Θ ∩ Δ Θ = ∅. This is expressed in requirement (ii) of the following definition. Requirement (i) makes sure that lines get marked at which A is derived on an assumption Δ that is violated in all minimal abnormal choice sets.
Definition 10. Where A is derived at line l of a proof from Γ on a condition Δ, line l is marked at stage s iff
(ii) for some Θ ∈ Φ s (Γ), there is no line at which A is derived on a condition Δ for which Θ ∩ Δ = ∅.
In view of this definition it follows that all of lines 6-8 are marked. For line 8, this is obvious: clause (i) of Definition 10 clearly obtains. For lines 6 and 7, clause (i) fails, but clause (ii) holds. For instance, there is no line in the proof at which outc is derived on a condition that has an empty intersection with { (a → c)}.
We now illustrate why Definition 10 refers to other lines than l in its clause (ii). Suppose we continue our proof, weakening the output obtained at lines 7 and 8:
Note that, since we have not derived any new Dab-formulas, A dynamic, stage-dependent notion of derivability is easy to define:
Definition 11. A formula A has been derived at stage s of an adaptive proof iff, at that stage, A is the second element of some unmarked line l.
Apart from the stage-dependent derivability relation, we also need a stage-independent, 'final' notion of derivability in order to define a syntactic consequence relation for our logics.
Definition 12. A is finally derived from Γ at line l of a proof at a finite stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line l, (ii) line l is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof in which line l is marked can be further extended in such a way that line l is unmarked.
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23 Definition 12 has a game-theoretic flavor to it. In [7] , this definition is interpreted as a two-player game in which the proponent has a winning strategy in case she has a reply to every counterargument by her opponent. As is clear from the definition, final derivability is not established within the dynamic proof itself, but rather by meta-reasoning (one has to quantify over possible extensions of the proof). For some this may be unsatisfactory (e.g., if one is interested in automated proving). We refer to [5] where a technique is presented that integrates a decision procedure for final derivability into dynamic proofs for the adaptive logic CLuN r by means of turning proofs goal directed [8] . Adjusting this technique for the systems presented in this paper is left for future work. The normal selections strategy. We saw how the minimal abnormality strategy is rather skeptical in its treatment of constrained outputs. In our example we were able to derive the minimal
This means that both conditionals together are not CMIO 1 -consistent with our given inputs and constraints. Since the disjunction is minimal, both a → c and b → d taken individually are consistent with the inputs and constraints. Nevertheless, a line whose formula is only derived on the condition { (a → c)} or only on the condition { (b → d)} is marked according to minimal abnormality (e.g., lines 6 and 7). This motivates another approach according to which an assumption is considered admissible in case its associated set of conditionals is consistent with the given inputs and constraints. That is to say: where Δ = { (A 1 → B 1 ) , . . . , (A n → B n )} is the condition of the line l, this line is marked only if Dab(Δ) is derived on the empty condition since this expresses that the set of conditionals { (A 1 → B 1 ) , . . . , (A n → B n )} is not consistent with the given input and constraints.
Let us spell out this more credulous alternative by means of the lower limit logic CMIO 1 . We now use the so-called normal selections strategy. The AL that has CMIO 1 as its LLL, Ω • (as defined above) as its set of abnormalities, and normal selections as its strategy is called MIO We consider again the proof from Γ 4 , but this time we mark lines according to the normal selections strategy.
Lines 6, 7, 10 and 11 remain unmarked in view of Definition 14, as their conditions have not been derived in the proof. Line 8 is marked since
The stage-dependent and stage-independent criteria for derivability (Definitions 11, 12) are equally applicable to MIO Some more words on proof dynamics. I/O functions equip us with consequence relations. In our characterization, the consequences of a given I/O function correspond to the finally derivable formulas (Definition 12). Dynamic proofs come with an additional notion of derivability, namely derivability at a stage (Definition 11).
This corresponds to the fact that non-monotonic resp. defeasible reasoning has two flavors and for many applications it seems natural to model both in an integrated way. From an abstract point of view non-monotonicity means that the output of a function is disproportionate to its input: more input may result in less output. The first and most commonly discussed flavor concerns the consequence function and the fact that adding premises may lead to a loss of conclusions. In adaptive proofs this is the dynamics behind final derivability (Definition 12). The second flavor of non-monotonicity we have with derivability-at-a-stage (Definition 11). Derivability-at-a-stage viewed as a function takes as its input a (possibly incomplete) analysis of a given premise set (represented by the proof at the given stage) and outputs formulas that are considered derived. Given a more refined analysis of the premise set at a later stage, some formulas may cease to be derived (formulas at unmarked lines). Let us apply this insight to I/O logics.
Consider a case where some I/O consequence B of G, A, C ceases to be an I/O consequence of G , A , C (where G ⊆ G , A ⊆ A and C ⊆ C ).
An adequate proof theory is expected to reflect this dynamics: outB will be (finally) derivable from Γ G,A,C , while it will not be (finally) derivable in a proof from Γ G ,A ,C . In the presented proof format this dynamics that is relative to adding premises is 'internalized' so that it is also relative to the growing analysis of the premises which is represented by the proof at a given stage. It works as follows: At each stage the given premises will be analysed to some degree, depending on which premises have already been introduced and depending on what rules have been already applied to them. Derivability-at-a-stage equips us with a retraction mechanism that is a function of this degree of analysis of the given premise set. This way the very rationale behind the non-monotonicity of I/O logics, namely that in face of new conflicts previous outputs may cease to be outputs, becomes a structural property of the presented dynamic proofs (and not just of the consequence relation).
This property of the presented proof theory is important since it models the dynamics of a reasoner in one of the following two situations.
First, we have a reasoner who is confronted with new factual or normative information in view of which previously drawn inferences have to be retracted: clearly a situation in which real life reasoners often find themselves. Pollock dubs this diachronic defeasibility [37] and Batens speaks of the external dynamics of defeasible reasoning [6] .
Another situation is that in which the given information is very complex and a reasoner has practical constraints (e.g., concerning time) which make it interesting for her to 'jump' to defeasible conclusions based on a given analysis of the premises (which, given the practical constraints, she considers to be sufficient). Pollock dubs this synchronic defeasibility and Batens speaks of the internal dynamics of reasoning.
In both situations it holds that, instead of starting the reasoning process from scratch whenever new information enters the picture, a real life reasoner will build on some of her previous inferences, use them to draw new inferences, and informed by these, will retract certain previous inferences. Retraction is thus local and case-specific. 25 The dynamic proof theory presented in this paper is adequate for such application contexts in that a user need not analyze the premises exhaustively before she can come to a (defeasible) conclusion and her conclusions can be formed in a computationally tractable way.
In situations in which a reasoner is confronted with (a) a finite set of (relevant) facts and (b) a finite set of conditional norms, and (c) in which there are no time-related or other types of constraints that motivate a reasoner to proceed in a defeasible manner, a rational reasoner will make inferences in a more cautious and controlled way. She will first carefully identify all normative conflicts (i.e., all minimal Dab-consequences), and only then and informed by the former, derive the output in such a way that no retraction of previously derived formulas is necessary. Here it is important to notice that nothing prevents a reasoner from applying this or some other heuristics to the dynamic proofs characterized above. Indeed, she may first introduce all the facts in A, all constraints in C and all conditional norms in G and on this basis derive the minimal Dab-consequences. The latter are all Dab(Δ) for which Δ ∈ Σ(Γ) where
This way she brings the proof to a stage s in which Σ s (Γ) = Σ(Γ). 26 Clearly, any (extension of a) proof in such a stage is not dynamic in view of the following fact 27 :
Fact 4. If Σ(Γ) = Σ s (Γ) and A is derived at the finite stage s, then A is finally derived.
Irrespective of whether we are in a situation in which (a)-(c) hold, it is interesting to have a criterion to decide whether a formula that is derived at a stage is finally derived. The previous fact equips us with such a criterion. 25 See also [51] where a similar case is made for belief revision. 26 Note that CMIO R is decidable. Hence, for each G ⊆ G we can check whether Γ (A → B) . Thus, there are no computational obstacles in bringing the proof to this stage. One may also make use of goal-directed decision procedures for adaptive logics as presented in e.g. [8] .
27 Fact 4 holds for any AL defined as in Section 3.1 (i.e., for any AL in the standard format).
Adaptive Characterizations of Constrained I/O Logics
Generic definition. We now move to a more abstract level, defining the adaptive logics that characterize the constrained I/O functions from Section 2.3. By adjusting the subscripts in the definitions of the generic inference rules from the previous section, we readily obtain a proof theory for MIO † R . By using the appropriate marking definition (see Definitions 10 and 14) and applying Definitions 12 and 13, we obtain a consequence relation.
The following is proven in Appendix 3:
Theorem 3. Where † ∈ {∩, ∪}, and A is CL-consistent or (F) ∈R:
Like Theorem 2, Theorem 3 does not cover the border case where A is inconsistent. As explained before, such cases are trivialized by our logics whereas (in case (ID) / ∈R) neither out
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Proof outline. In the remainder of this section, we broadly explain how we prove the equivalence set out in Theorem 3 between the adaptive consequence relations on the one hand, and the constrained I/O operations on the other. The reader is kindly referred to Appendix 3 for more details.
Let us first deal with the special case in which there are no maxfamilies.
28 Take the simple example where G = C = ∅ and A = {⊥} in which case out As a consequence, we know now that Theorem 3 holds whenever out R (∅, A) ∪ C is CL-inconsistent. For the other case we need a more involved argument for which it is useful to introduce some additional notation.
Notation. Let Θ ⊆ f Δ denote that Θ is a finite subset of Δ. Where Δ is a set of formulas of the form
Where G is a set of I/O pairs we will just write
Recall from Section 3.
that Dab(Δ) is a Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ CMIO R Dab(Δ). It is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff there is no Δ ⊂ Δ such that Γ CMIO R Dab(Δ ). We let Σ(Γ) be the set of all Δ for which Dab(Δ) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ and Φ(Γ) is the set of all minimal choice sets of Σ(Γ).
Let us start with the operations out ∩ R and logics MIO ∩ R . The first theorem which we need has been established for all ALs with the minimal abnormality strategy in [6] :
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For the specific case where Γ = Γ G,A,C for some G, A, C, we can further strengthen Theorem 4 to Corollary 1 in view of the following lemma:
The second property which we need is the following:
In this theorem and the results below we adopt the following writing convention: where Δ = ∅, "∨Dab(Δ)" denotes the empty string. 
As we saw before, maxfamily (G, A, C) = {{(a, c), (a∧b, e)}, {(b, d), (a∧b, e) }}. On the other hand, Φ(
We leave it to the reader to check that this conforms to Theorem 5.
The third ingredient for the meta-proof is the following theorem, which links out R to CMIO R :
With these properties at our disposal, the proof of Theorem 3 for the case † = ∩ becomes relatively short. Suppose out R (∅, A) ∪ C CL-consistent and A is CL-consistent or (F) ∈R. The following five properties are equivalent by Corollary 1 (items 1 and 2), Theorem 5 (items 2 and 3), Theorem 6 (item 3 and 4) and Definition 6 (item 4 and 5): A, C) . For the full join constrained output functions, out ∪ R , we can apply basically the same reasoning, relying on the following variant of Theorem 4:
In view of this fact, it suffices to replace "for all" by "for some" and the reference to Definition 6 with Definition 7 in the above proof, in order to obtain a proof for the case where † = ∪.
Expressive Power: Going Beyond I/O Logic
By considering complex formulas other than in A and out B on the left resp. the right side of ⇒, our framework enables us to express more facets of normative reasoning than I/O logic. In this section we explore some of the possibilities.
We first note that in the I/O formalism we have only two ways to introduce negations into I/O pairs (A, B):
(i) negating the input: (¬A, B) which may be read e.g. as "The input ¬A is a reason to have B in the output."
(ii) negating the output: (A, ¬B) which may be read e.g. as "The input A is a reason to have ¬B in the output."
In our framework these cases are covered by in¬A ⇒ outB and inA ⇒ out¬B respectively. Linguists and logicians have pointed out that allowing for other uses of negation in the context of conditionals significantly enriches the expressiveness and makes the formal model more apt to capture argumentation and defeasible reasoning [1, 2] . These authors mention, for instance,
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(iii) "The input A is not a reason to have B in the output."
(iv) "The input A is a reason against having B in the output."
In our framework we can cover these cases by
Moreover, we can express, e.g., More generally, we may allow for other complex formulas on the left side of ⇒. We now demonstrate how the additional expressive power is useful for the modelling of various central notions in deontic logic such as sanctions, violations, exceptions, and permissions.
Violations and sanctions.
It has been noted in [19] that in I/O logics it is not possible to express violations and sanctions. 32 The authors use the following example:
1. In general you ought not to have a dog ( , ¬d), and 2. If you have a dog and the obligation to not have a dog is actual, then you ought to pay a fine.
(2) cannot be expressed by means of a normal I/O pair since the condition includes deontic information. In our setting we can express (2) This can be used to explicitely express exceptions as e.g., (¬in a ∧ in m) ⇒ out ¬f which may express that being served a meal (m) which is not asparagus (a) we're obliged not to eat with fingers f .
In non-monotonic logics the modelling of conditionals that allow for exceptions often takes place under a closed world assumption: while positive (relevant) information is presented (like the fact that a meal is served in m), negative information is omitted (like the fact that it is not the case that asparagus is served ¬in a). For instance, given
} we expect to derive out¬f , while if we add in a to Γ we expect to derive out f .
The adaptive systems presented above can easily be enhanced so that the negation in ¬in A is interpreted as a default negation which holds whenever there is no input to the contrary. A simple way to achieve this is to use the set of abnormalities Ω defneg = {in A | A ∈ W}. Various techniques are available that allow to define adaptive logics in which both sets of abnormalities Ω defneg and Ω + • are considered (see e.g., [48, 49] ). The most straightforward way is to use an adaptive logic based on Ω
• . From Γ defneg we then can derive ¬in a and out¬f .
Some examples motivate a further refinement of our approach. Take ∧ ¬in a) ⇒ out c) . This implies that out d is not derivable since it can only be derived on the condition {in a,
Under a more strict reading of 'negation as failure to derive' we want to derive ¬in A iff in A is not derivable (via CMIO R ) from the given premises. For Γ defneg this means that we expect ¬in a to be derivable. Given ¬in a, we have a conflict between the two triggered conditionals (in e ∧ ¬in a) ⇒ out c and in b ⇒ out¬c. Since (in b ∧ ¬in a) ⇒ out d is triggered and not related to the conflict we expect also that out d is derivable. One way to achieve this is to sequentially combine adaptive logics-say AL 1 and AL 2 -such that the combined logic AL has the consequence set: Cn AL (Γ) = Cn AL 2 (Cn AL 1 (Γ)). By letting AL 1 be based on Ω defneg we first minimize abnormalities of the form in A and hence interpret the given facts under negation as failure. AL 2 is then based on Ω + • which allows to apply detachment to conditionals 'as much as possible'. Dynamic proof theories for such combinations are defined in [45, 47] . Another option is e.g. to use lexicographic adaptive logics [49] . In such adaptive logics, both ¬in a and out d are derivable from Γ defneg , while neither out c nor out¬c are.
Permissions by default.
A similar approach can be used to model weak or negative permissions [9, 31] . The idea is that A is permitted whenever we can deduce that there is no obligation to ¬A. Arguably, in many applications this notion of weak permissions is too restrictive and a stronger principle seems more adequate which allows us to derive the permission to bring about A whenever out¬A is not derivable (and not just if ¬out¬A is derived, see also [9] ). This can be modelled by ¬out¬A where the negation with the wide scope (the one preceding 'out') is a default negation (i.e., it is interpreted as a 'negation as failure to derive'). As an illustration, take t ∨ r) )}. Note that we have the minimal Dab-formula (p → s) ∨ (q → ¬s). This means that out(t ∨ r) is derivable and hence also ¬out¬(t ∨ r) (the permission to bring about t ∨ r). Now, were we to interpret negations preceeding 'out' as default negations we would also get, for instance, ¬out¬t and ¬out¬r which makes t and r permitted. Indeed, we can neither derive the obligation to ¬t nor the obligation to ¬r and hence, according to the notion of negative permission both t and r are permitted.
Technically this way of modelling weak permissions is realized by letting Ω wper = {out A | A ∈ W} and by using combined adaptive logics that first minimize according to the abnormalities in Ω • (resp. Ω + • ) and then according to the abnormalities in Ω wper .
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Permissive norms. In some applications it is useful to have permissive norms as part of the conditional norms in the premise set. An option is to use inA ⇒ ¬out¬B: given A we have a reason to suppose that ¬B is not obliged resp. that B is permitted.
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Since in our lower limit logics CMIO R we have modus ponens for ⇒, we can derive ¬out¬B from in A and in A ⇒ ¬out¬B. Depending on the rules in R we get other properties for conditional permissions. E.g., if out is a KD-modality (i.e., in all CMIO R variants) we get,
Where, additionally, ⇒ supports right-weakening (where A B, (C ⇒ A) ⊃ (C ⇒ B) ), we also have
Here's a simple example for an adaptive proof with the lower limit logic CMIO R (where R contains (SI), (WO) and (AND)), the set of abnormalities Ω + • , the minimal abnormality strategy, and the premise set Γ = {in p, in q,
See the paragraph on exceptions above for more details. 34 To simplify things, in our discussion of conditional permissions we here only consider the option of using the definition of permissions as known from Standard Deontic Logic where P is ¬O¬ (which translates to ¬out¬ in our setting). Another option would be to use a dedicated permission operator pout.
It is easy to see that ¬out¬t is finally derivable while neither out¬s nor ¬out¬s are finally derivable due to the minimal Dab-formula at line 9.
An interesting further extension of this embedding of permissions in our approach is to prioritize (conditional) permissions over conflicting conditional obligations. Technically this is straightforward: we first minimize abnormalities in Ω condPerm = { A | A is of the form in B ⇒ ¬out C} and only then the abnormalities in Ω • . This way, whenever we have in A, •(in A ⇒ out B) and •(in A ⇒ ¬out¬B), we will only be able to detach ¬out¬B. In our example above, this would lead to the derivability of the permission ¬out¬s detached at line 7 in the proof, whereas the obligation out¬s at line 6 is not derivable. Prioritizing permissions in this way gives us a concept that is similar to Stolpe's notion of 'permission as derogation' [43] . We return to this point in Section 5.3 where we discuss prioritized norms.
Discussion
Modularity and Variants
Recall that all I/O operations are obtained by varying two parameters: (i) the way the maxfamily is used when generating output (join vs. meet of the outfamily), and (ii) the rules under which the set of generators G is closed. Both are mirrored by a specific feature of our systems. The adaptive strategy provides the counterpart of (i), whereas the rules mentioned in (ii) are translated literally into inference rules for conditionals of the lower limit logic (in line with Table 2 ). Hence, structural properties of the original system are mirrored by structural properties of the system into which it is translated. This makes our translation procedure very unifying and natural. As a result, one may alter these frameworks in various straightforward ways, while preserving the representation theorems.
Below, we briefly discuss additional variations with respect to (i) and (ii), showing how these are translated into our adaptive framework. We will indicate why these variations seem interesting, but leave their full exploration for a later occasion. Additional options for variation will be discussed in Section 5.3. G, A, C) . However, there is a difference between both outputs in view of the way they are generated from the two maxfamilies H = {(a, c),
Using terminology from default logic, conclusions such as c ∨ d may be called floating conclusions [28] . In our terms, they can be defined as those formulas in out ∩ R (G, A, C) which cannot be generated from the I/O pairs that are shared by every member of maxfamily R (G, A, C) . Note that c ∨ d can only be obtained by applying the pairs (a, b), resp. (c, d) , neither of which are in H∩H . In contrast, e is obtained by the application of a conditional (a∧b, e) which is contained in both H and H .
The status of floating conclusions has been the subject of vigorous debate. Following [28] , some have argued that we should accept them just as any other non-monotonic consequence (see also [38] ), whereas others have come up with various examples in order to show they are problematic [23] . Consequently, several non-monotonic logics have been modified in order to allow or disallow the derivation of floating conclusions (e.g., [23, 37] ).
It is not our aim to take a stance in this long-lasting debate. For the present purposes, note that there is a straightforward alternative to Definition 6 in view of which floating conclusions are avoided 35 :
Our nomenclature echoes that from [40] where a similar technique is applied in a more narrow setting. 36 In the above example, we have e ∈ out 1 (G, A, C) and c ∨ d ∈ out 1 (G, A, C) .
The operation of free output can be characterized in our adaptive framework by using the so-called reliability strategy. Let us illustrate the basic idea behind this strategy in terms of the above example. We take another look at Γ 5 and show how oute can be derived.
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This proposal is completely analogous to the one from [23, Chap. 7] , where a default logic is proposed that invalidates floating conclusions. 36 More precisely, the Free Rescher-Manor consequence relation from [40] reduces to the specific case where A = C = ∅ and all members of G are of the form ( , A). We leave the verification of this claim to the interested reader.
The idea behind marking for the reliability strategy is straightforward: a line is marked at stage s iff some member of its condition occurs in a minimal Dab-formula at stage s. Formally: Using this strategy, not only lines 6-8 are marked at stage 14 (as was the case with the minimal abnormality strategy), but also line 10 and line 11. However, line 14 is not marked.
Where † ∈ {+, −}, let MIO †, R be the AL defined by (i) the lower limit logic CMIO † R , (ii) the set of abnormalities Ω • = { (A → B) | A, B ∈ W}, and (iii) the strategy Reliability. We write MIO R to refer to any of the two variants. As before, the adaptive proofs are dynamic. So we need to apply Definitions 12 and 13 to obtain a stable consequence relation for the logics MIO R . The following holds 37 :
Where A is CL-consistent or (F) ∈R:
Let us make one last remark before leaving the matter. Recall that the strategy only affects the marking definition, whereas the generic inference rules are independent of it. Hence, simply by considering different marking definitions for an adaptive proof one can switch between the various strategies to check whether (according to our insights at the present stage of the proof) some conclusion is e.g. a member of the free constrained output, or whether it only follows by the full meet constrained output.
Other rules for conditionals. Given the existing variation in terms of rules for I/O pairs, one may also consider additional rule systems for conditionals. Such systems can be obtained by skipping some of the rules or by adding others. Makinson and van der Torre make a similar remark in Section 9 of [29] , where they discuss several other rules, e.g. contraposition (CONT), (full) transitivity (T), and conditionalisation (COND) 38 :
If (A, B) and (B, C), then (A, C).
Both in the unconstrained and the constrained case, our modal framework can easily deal with the addition of such extra rules. That is, the representation theorems mentioned in preceding sections can be shown to hold for arbitrary R as long as R is normal and contains only rules of the form: " If  A 1 CL B 1 , . . . , A n CL B n and (C 1 , D 1 ) , . . . , (C m , D m ), then (E, F )". The rules in R are translated into rules for conditionals in the associated lower limit logic CMIO R . Thus, we can characterize the operations out ∩ R , out ∪ R and out R in terms of adaptive proof theories.
Comparison
Besides our characterization of constrained I/O logics there have been other reconstructions in terms of non-monotonic logics. Already in [29] a link was established between extensions of Reiter's default logic [39] and the outfamilies of out + 3 : the former form a (usually) strict subset of the latter (given an appropriate translation).
In [19] we find a stronger embedding of constrained I/O logics based on out A (normal) L-parametrized logic program consists of a set of rules of the form 39 :
are L-formulas and not is interpreted in terms of 'negation as failure'. 40 For instance, out + 3 is characterized by the following logic program based on G, A (disregarding constraints), where the language of CL is enriched by a set Φ of auxiliary constants r Φ for every r = (A, B) in G encoding that r is 'discharged' 41 :
The idea is to select stable models of = (A, B) ∈ G). Both representations provide a characterization of the maxfamilies: in the representation by 39 The structural similarities between parametrized logic programming and ALs clearly motivate future investigations concerning comparisons between the two frameworks and possible embeddings. E.g., we know that default and autoepistemic logic can be embedded in ALs on the basis of the modal characterization in [26] . This motivates modal translations of the rules of parametrized logic programming. E.g., a possible path is to translate (1) 
Negation as failure may then be implemented by treating A as an abnormality. In order to embed ALs with the minimal abnormality strategy in parametrized logic programs rules such as ¬A ← not A (for all abnormalities A) may be used for implementing the idea that abnormalities are classically negated as little as possible. 40 The essential difference with orthodox logic programs is that parametrized logic programs allow for complex formulas in the language of L in the head and in the body of the rules. 41 The original characterization in [19, Theorem 1.2] contained a mistake. In correspondence with the authors we present here a corrected version. Compared with the original characterization we have two main changes: 1. there is no need for the additional · -operator, instead constants of the type rΦ are introduced to encode that a rule is not applied; 2. in addition to selecting the stable models of the program P3, a post-selection is needed that selects all stable models that validate minimally many formulas in Φ (the idea is to apply detachment to as many I/O pairs as possible). A similar correction is needed in order to obtain a correct characterization of out means of ALs the minimal choice sets correspond exactly to the maxfamilies in view of Theorem 5, in the representation by means of logic programs a subset of the stable models corresponds exactly to the maxfamilies (see [19, Theorem 1] and Fn. 41).
Outlook
Just like I/O logics, our adaptive characterizations can easily be varied, enriched, and adjusted for different application contexts. This has already been explicated for some straightforward variants in Section 5.1. Let us in this outlook give some examples of how the presented framework can be further enhanced by enriching the formal language or changing the underlying monotonic logic.
Priorities. In some applications it may be useful to introduce priorities among the I/O pairs. This idea is not new in the context of logics based on maximal consistent subsets. For instance, in Brewka's 'preferred subtheories'-approach [15] priorities among formulas are considered when the maximal consistent subsets are selected that form the basis for his consequence relations. A similar procedure can be realized by a slight generalization of the framework presented in this paper. Instead of modeling all given I/O conditionals on a par by means of •, we encode priorities among them by prefixing them with • i (i ∈ N) where i indicates the priority we attach to the conditional. The abnormalities are then presented by the set Ω = {• i A ∧ ¬A | i ≥ 1, A ∈ W }. Moreover, we can make use of socalled lexicographic ALs [49, 50] that take care of the priorities in a natural way.
Instead of 'hard-coding' priorities one may also consider priorities that arise in view of logical relationships among norms such as specificity cases in which more specific norms override conflicting norms (see e.g. [44, 52] ). One challenge is that specificity introduces an additional level of defeasibility, since norms are in force unless they are canceled by more specific norms with which they conflict. This may also motivate giving up on (SI) (or at least to restrict it) which is currently not possible in our systems.
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Quantitative considerations. In other applications also quantitative considerations may play a role: if we have two maxfamilies to choose from, but in one (significantly) more I/O pairs are 'violated', we may have good reasons to choose the option to violate fewer norms. A format for ALs that is expressive enough to embed also quantitative variants has been recently investigated in [45, Chap. 5] . In view of these results it is easy to devise variants of the logics presented in this paper that implement quantitative considerations.
Inconsistent facts. I/O logics only deal with conflicts among the I/O pairs but are not designed for applications where also the factual input may be conflicting. This can easily be fixed in a way that is coherent with one of the main mechanisms behind I/O logics: namely to work with maximal consistent families. The idea is simply to first form maximal consistent subsets of the factual input and subsequently to apply to each of these sets the respective I/O function. Both steps can straightforwardly be integrated in an AL framework that generalizes the framework presented in this paper by means of combining it with the techniques presented in [34] .
Going predicative. Using our framework opens the prospect of applying the constrained I/O mechanism to predicate logic: i.e., for instance to allow for input of the form in(∀xP (x)) or conditionals of the form (∀xP (x)) → (∃xQ(x)) or ∀x(P (x) → Q(x)). The reason why the original (constrained) I/O functions are suboptimal for the explication of defeasible reasoning in this context is due to the undecidability of predicate logic: there is no effective way to perform the consistency check that is necessary to calculate the maxfamilies. 43 The dynamic proof theory of ALs comes in handy since it doesn't force us to make consistency checks 'on the spot'. Instead, we can defeasibly assume that a set of conditionals is consistent. E.g., in a MIO ∪ Rproof from Γ G,A,C we may derive outA on the condition Δ = { (B → C) | (B, C) ∈ H} where H ⊆ G. This means that we derive outA on the assumption that H is consistent with the given input and the given constraints (i.e., it is a subset of a maxfamily of G, A, C ). In case this doesn't hold we know that we will be able to derive Dab(Δ) on the empty condition eventually and hence we will be forced to mark the line. 43 A similar observation has been made by Horty [21, p. 50] in the context of his dyadic enrichment of an older system by Van Fraassen [53] that is based on consistency considerations. 44 The merits of the dynamic proofs of ALs when a positive test for consistency is not available have been pointed out before, e.g. by Batens in the context of ALs for inductive generalizations [4] .
Conclusion
We reconstructed I/O logics as modal adaptive logics and proved this reconstruction to be equivalent to the original definition. Apart from the purely technical interest in translating systems from one formal framework to another, we argued that our characterization has some additional advantages.
First, our logics come with a proof theory that mirrors various types of defeasible reasoning. Both of Pollock's notions of synchronic and diachronic defeasibility are modeled in adaptive proofs. Moreover, the proof theory can deal with the case-specific retraction of conclusions in the light of new input (Section 3.1).
Second, our reconstruction allows for more flexibility in the formulation of the premises. E.g., in order to express violations and sanctions deontic information may appear in the body of our conditionals that express I/O rules (Section 4).
Third, making use of techniques from the adaptive logics framework, we obtain new and interesting variations of the original I/O functions. This can be achieved by varying either the adaptive strategy or by varying the rules of the lower limit logic (Section 5.1).
To prove (2) (resp. (3)) it suffices to show that (i) whenever D is a MIO R − -axiom (resp. a MIO R + -axiom), then D ∈ Γ and (ii) Γ is closed under all the MIO R − -rules (resp. all the MIO R + -rules).
Ad (i).
For the CL-axioms, this follows immediately in view of the construction. So we move on to the KD-axioms for in.
Ad ( (G, A) . By the construction of Γ 3 , outB ∈ Γ 3 and hence outB ∈ Γ .
As for the rules in R → this follows immediately by the translation schemes in Table 2 , the construction of Γ 2 , and Facts 5 and 6.
By (2) (resp. (3)), Γ MIO R ⊥ since ⊥ / ∈ Γ . Hence since ¬outA ∈ Γ 3 ⊆ Γ , outA / ∈ Γ and thus, by (2) (resp. (3)), Γ MIO R outA. Note that Γ G,A ⊆ Γ . By the monotonicity of MIO R , Γ G,A MIO R outA.
Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Theorems 9 and 10.
Appendix 2: Some Properties of CMIO R
In this section, we prove some properties of the systems CMIO R which will be helpful for establishing the representation theorems in the next two sections. The properties and their proofs are strongly linked to those from the previous section. 
Appendix 4: Proof of Theorem 8
The following property is known to hold for adaptive logics with the reliability strategy. It follows immediately from Theorems 6 and 11.5 in [6] .
